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ABSTRACT

Social conflict, as opposed to armed conflict, has received less attention in the field of
quantitative research. This paper investigates the structural causes of political violence in 35
African states using data from the Social Conflict in Africa dataset and the Beck and Katz panel
corrected standard errors time series regression model. Theoretically, a closed political
opportunity structure, combined with a weak state unable to provide public goods, should
together produce high levels of social conflict. The independent variables attempt to
operationalize these concepts from four different angles. In this analysis Access to Education and
Infrastructure (AEI), Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF), Freedom in the World Political
Rights (FIW), and National Material Capabilities (NMC) were all significant predictors of social
conflict. This study found that as the level of ethnic fractionalization and material capabilities
within states rose, the frequency of social conflict events also increased. However, as access to
infrastructure and political rights declined, the number of social conflict events increased. Wald
chi-square and R-square values suggest that the model is complete and has substantial
explanatory power.
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INTRODUCTION

Conflict studies are common in international relations research and assorted current
events have highlighted their importance. From 9/11 and the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai to the
London and Madrid bombings to intra-African insurgencies, violent activism has grown as
perpetual concerns for states around the world. The recent history of popular uprisings, such as
the Arab Spring and the more extended democratic movements of the African Summer,
emphasizes the need to explain the causes of such incidents and, more broadly, the creation of
activist organizations within Africa's population. This paper attempts to contribute to the answer
of these questions by examining the structural causes of social conflict, which includes unarmed
violence such as riots and protests. While armed, state conflict has received a great deal of
attention in academia, social conflict has attracted less research, creating a void for possible
explanations for both types of conflict.
The social angle of this investigation may provide insight that has previously eluded
researchers who restrict their analyses to armed conflict. Broadening the scope of conflict studies
to include riots and protests when attempting to identify predictors should bring to light
independent variables that previously were thought to be insignificant or were never considered
in the first place. People may choose social conflict over armed rebellion because participation is
simpler and easier and danger is distributed across a large group of unidentified dissenters. Also,
problems they perceive in society may merit violent uprising, but not a complete change of
government. If people attempt to redress their grievances through social conflict, but are unable
to foment the desired change, they may decide that their injustices warrant the escalation into all1

out rebellion. Following this line of reasoning, social conflict may in fact precede revolutions
and serve as a precursor in their development. Therefore, arguments for social conflict can also
be viewed as supporting armed revolution, and vice versa.
This thesis asks the question: does a relationship exist between political opportunity
structure, strength of the state, and number of social conflict events (SCEs)? Citizens'
opportunities to influence their government through normal politics should affect the types of
grievances they feel and how willing they are to resort to group activism. Furthermore, weaker
governments are less able to identify and punish demonstrators, so people should feel that
protesting is safer in weak states. This answer draws on social movement theory and previous
riot and protest case studies, as explained in the Literature Review.
This thesis focuses exclusively on social conflict in Africa for a number of reasons. First,
there is rich, recent data for social conflict on the African continent. Second, there is more social
conflict on the African continent than in many other areas of the globe. Third, much of Africa
scores on the low end for the predictor variables used in this paper. Differences at this lower end
of the scale should lead to greater variation in the number of social conflict events because each
change should have more impact on the people. For example, if most of the people have little-tono political rights, gaining some rights should have more of an effect than if people with myriad
political rights gain an added civil liberty, such as a stronger right to privacy.
This paper's structural explanation for social conflict rests on two concepts: political
opportunity structure and state strength. If citizens do not feel as though they have any method of
influencing their government through normal means like elections, they are more likely to resort
2

to group activism than if they trust in some sort of representation. Second, weaker governments
are less able to control their territory and leave more openings for violent, organized uprisings.
Furthermore, until recently, social movement studies as an academic discipline have
experienced a shortage of large N analysis-based research. This paper attempts to explain some
of the variation in social conflict activity and development with a large N time series regression
model. Such a method helps to distinguish between explanations that are only possible and those
that demonstrate some validity.
The analysis for this paper uses an adjusted ordinary least squares (OLS) panel corrected
standard errors time series regression model, developed by Beck and Katz (1995). I chose a time
series model because social conflict events might often be explained by causes that appear in the
years prior to the events' actual occurrence. Moreover, many case studies of riots and protests
draw unique conclusions as to the predictors of social conflict. Hopefully this paper's continentwide time series model can identify independent variables with more encompassing validity. The
dependent variable for this project is how many social conflict events occurred in each state per
year. The outcome is an interval level variable, with values corresponding to the exact number of
events.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

When facing a choice whether to participate in social conflict, armed revolution,
nonviolent civil resistance, or to do nothing, people will favor social conflict in a number of
circumstances for several reasons. Social conflict events include protests, riots, strikes, intercommunal clashes, and government action against the population provoked by the people
Strikes and communal clashes should emerge as a method of confronting a closed political
opportunity structure because citizens have no ability to influence the government through
normal means like elections, they need no permission to participate in social conflict events, and
they may be able to force the state to address them. (Lichbach 1987; Jenkins and Klandermans
1995; McAdam et al 1996; Crenshaw 2010) People might also participate in riots and protests if
they live in a weak state, because weaker governments do not provide many public goods, nor
are they able to identify and punish protesters. (Skocpol 1994; McAdam et al 1996; Burgoon
2006; Atzili 2010) Social conflict is preferable to revolution because it requires less effort and
planning, and offers more individual protection for participants (Scott 1985; Chenoweth and
Stephan 2011). Social conflict is also preferable to nonviolent resistance when the government
does not tolerate social movements, because nonviolent resistance would not be more safe or
efficacious than social conflict and violence might increase the perception of the movement's
strength. (Goldstone 2001; Crenshaw 2010) Finally, social conflict is preferable to inaction if
people judge grievances to justify giving up some safety, participation is convenient, and they
perceive the movement to have a certain level of efficacy. (Karklins and Petersen 1993;
McAdam et al 1996)
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Recent literature focusing on the causes of social conflict attempts to identify causal
economic, political, and demographic factors. Research has delved into connections between
poverty, education level, state strength, social movements and repression with the formation of
activist groups. However, due to a focus on case studies, many reports posit unique and
contradictory explanations for social conflict. From attempts to explain riots (Horowitz 2000;
Brass 2003; Karklins and Petersen 1993), to the relationship between poverty and conflict (White
1989; White 1993; Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Honaker 2008) or state strength and conflict
(Newman 2007; Atzili 2010), researchers have developed slightly, or even drastically different
answers. This paper's continent-wide time series model tries to identify structural independent
variables with more complete reliability. Moreover, social conflict events might often be
explained by causes that appear in the years prior to the events' actual occurrence, emphasizing
the potential power of a time series regression.

Riots and Protests:
Why do ordinary people participate in riots and protests? What causes social conflict to
happen in the first place? In The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India,
Paul Brass (2003) identifies four contributing factors: the functional utility of riots, the role of
the state, the institutionalized riot system, and contextualization. First, riots provide benefits to
many people, from criminals and businessmen to local politicians who can assume the position
of protectors. Second, governments have responsibility for preventing and controlling the
outbreak of riots, and they often do not have the ability or the desire to expend resources
maintaining the peace. Third, Brass argues that riots can become engrained in societal dynamics;
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"the scene has been prepared with numerous rehearsals marked by tension, rumors, and
provocations, in which the signals that an outbreak is about to occur... have been made clear."
(Brass 2003, 378) Finally, Brass thinks that the widespread attention devoted to trying to find
causes for riots "provides a license to many to loot, burn, and kill for revenge, profit, or pure fun
under the cover of broader explanations provided by the authorities, journalists, and social
scientists." (Brass 2003, 380)
On the other hand, Donald Horowitz (2000) attributes riots to the influence of rumors and
communal hatred in The Deadly Ethnic Riot. These rumors are based on an actual event, but
grossly exaggerate the severity of the violence to play off of ethnic grievances. Rumors concern
secret outrages that are extreme enough to close alternative peaceful channels of activity and
serve to establish confidence in the necessity of taking action. As a result of the rumors, rioters
feel justification and moral impunity. (Horowitz 2000)
This paper adopts elements from each of these theorists by including state strength and
the division of power along ethnic lines in the regression model. However, this analysis hinges
less on case studies and is more focused on identifying cross-cultural phenomena that affect
riots and protests across years and state borders. The structural nature of this model and the
factors it uses, access to public goods, strength of state industry, ethnic power divisions and
political rights are more broad, but still take into account many case-based issues.
What factors would influence ordinary people's decision to engage in riots and protests
versus other forms of resistance? James Scott (1985) posits in Weapons of the Weak that peasant
populations would elect other types of resistance because they do not have the power to directly
6

confront the government. Scott highlights the benefits of smaller-scale dissent saying, "They
require little or no coordination or planning; they make use of implicit understandings and
informal networks; they often represent a form of individual self-help; they typically avoid any
direct, symbolic confrontation with authority." (Scott 1985, xvi) Scott mentions myriad examples
of this phenomenon: "foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering,
feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so forth." (Scott 1985, 29) Often issues that
affect the peasantry comprise taxes, planting regulations, unfair laws, etc. Scott explains that
poor citizenry will not risk overt confrontation with authorities over these sorts of problems
because they are scattered without structure across the land, do not have any formal organization,
and are prepared for drawn-out, defensive attrition campaigns. Any peasant would choose
squatting, desertion, or pilfering as opposed to an actual invasion, obvious mutiny, or attacks on
stores. (Scott 1985) Scott's argument addresses minor infractions by the government against the
people, such as over taxation or crop regulation. This thesis deals with more pressing concerns,
like access to water, electricity, political representation, etc, which may cause the population to
choose more violent forms of protest than Scott's foot-dragging.
Similar to Scott's reasoning, in Why Civil Resistance Works, Chenoweth and Stephan
(2011) contend that nonviolent campaigns have an advantage over violent insurgencies because
the "moral, physical, informational, and commitment barriers to participation are much lower."
(Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 10) They further show that the higher grass roots participation in
nonviolent movements significantly increase their chances of success and decrease the
probability of a relapse into civil war.
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Will Moore (1995) offers a counterargument to Scott, Chenoweth and Stephan and
addresses the free-rider problem of mass participation in violent social conflict. Since riots and
protests seek collective goods (redress of grievances), people will benefit from the event even if
they do not participate. Therefore, rational people should decide against participation in
collective activism. In order to explain why people do end up joining social conflict events,
Moore summarizes a number of theorists' ideas. The explanations that he found most valid
include Popkin's (1979) efficacy solution and the tipping games of Goldstone (1994), Lohmann
(1992), and Karklins and Peterson (1993). Popkin argues that people who participate in social
conflict events believe that their contribution to the effort will have an impact on the probability
that the event will be successful. People do not have perfect information and their ability to
assess their efficacy may not be perfect either. Furthermore, leaders can manipulate information
to convince people that their participation will have an effect. "If a large overall goal can be
broken down into many small independent pieces, all of which are necessary, then the free-rider
problem can be overcome...Collective goods are financed by convincing persons that each
member's contributions will have a perceptible effect." (Popkin 1979, 257 in Moore 1995, 435)
Goldstone argues that the free rider problem will be overcome whenever group members
all believe in doing one's fair share. "Group action is so pervasive in ordinary society that the
free-rider problem is solved by adopting norms that allow the members of identifiable,
knowledge-sharing groups to achieve effective group action." (Goldstone 1994, 148-149 in
Moore 1995, 437) Lohmann uses an economic model called informational cascades to explain
tipping points. She contends that people form groups, which form coalitions, which form large
conflict events. "Different actors have different preferences for rebellion, but shifts in the number
8

of people who are supporting the rebellion have an impact on the preferences of others." (Moore
1995, 446)
Karklins and Petersen (1993) continue the discussion of tipping points by approaching
riot participation through the lens of game theory. They identify two considerations in the
potential protester's assurance game: protection and prediction. Protection involves security
against physical repression while demonstrating and safety from being sanctioned in a personal
environment. Prediction includes knowing the probability of being protected at the
demonstration site and the chances that the regime the demonstrators are protesting will collapse.
The integral point for them is that "the individual pay-off for a choice is determined by the
choices of the rest of the population." (Karklins and Petersen 1993, 591) At low levels of dissent,
the personal value to not participate is much higher than the choice to participate because
governments can quickly find and punish small groups of dissenters. As the number of
demonstrators rises, the likelihood (born of legitimacy) that the regime will sanction any single
individual falls. In order for society to move from low levels of dissent to a tipping point with
high enough participation for riots to form, two things must happen. First, groups that have lower
tipping points combine to inflate the percentage of participation enough that groups with higher
thresholds will be affected. Second, as more groups reach tipping points, other groups will use
them as references and lower their perceptions of regime will or effectiveness. (Karklins and
Petersen 1993)
This paper follows the thought processes of Karklins and Petersen, Horowitz and Brass,
instead of Scott, Chenoweth and Stephan. Ordinary people will participate in riots and protests as
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opposed to other forms of conflict and political representation for several reasons. First, the
blame is spread across all of the dissenters, making them less accountable. Second, in most of the
countries with frequent riots, citizens are aware that the government is too weak to be able to
identify and punish individual demonstrators. Third, when communities are repressed (i.e. fewer
political rights and access to public goods) and members gather to discuss the unfairness of their
situation, the group dynamics can incite attendees to collective anger and eventual violence.
Fourth, as power becomes more severely divided along ethnic lines, communal hatred has room
to fester and grow. Fifth, once a core assembly of dissenters begins spreading rumors and
planning a riot, it becomes easier and easier for ordinary people to participate, because the core
takes charge of developing logistics and delegation. Sixth, warlord style governments that are not
concerned with citizen safety will often allow riots to happen rather than expend resources to
control them.

Poverty:
The causal relationship between poverty and violent uprising is often assumed. For
example, George W. Bush pronounced in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002, “We fight against poverty,
because hope is an answer to terror.” From the other side of the world, in his Nobel Prize
acceptance speech, economist Muhammad Yunus (2006) of Bangladesh said, “We must address
the root causes of terrorism to end it for all time to come. I believe that putting resources into
improving the lives of the poor people is a better strategy than spending it on guns.”
However, these assumptions are not borne out by research. The 9/11 Commission Report
(2004) argues that deprived individuals typically do not resort to violent extremism. The 2004
10

report reads, “Terrorism is not caused by poverty.” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks,
378) Other researchers concur. Krueger and Maleckova (2003) found that in the West Bank,
early in the 1980s, the majority of Israeli Jewish settlers who attacked Palestinians had highpaying jobs. They further note that participants in Hezbollah’s more militant faction in the late
1980s and early 1990s were as likely to come from high income families as they were to come
from economically disadvantaged families. Additionally, White (1989, 1993) examined the
factors that led to the Irish Republican Army's (IRA) violent attacks in Northern Ireland between
1969 and 1980, in spite of the rest of the population choosing peaceful protest. He showed that
state repression increased support of IRA attacks and found no correlation between
unemployment and political violence. Conversely, Honaker (2008) analyzed the same conflict,
but divided his investigation into Catholic-instigated violence and Protestant-instigated violence.
Once split, his analysis revealed that unemployment among Catholics engendered a perception of
economic discrimination and was a leading cause of Catholic attacks. On the other hand, the
occurrence of organized violent crimes, including murders, is typically found to be unrelated to
economic opportunities. If structured violent crime is unrelated to economic opportunity, it
follows that violent uprisings may be unrelated as well. (Krueger and Maleckova 2003)
The measurement issues between different areas of research, one claiming poverty
contributes to social conflict, and the other suggesting it does not, reinforce the need for an
encompassing large N analysis that takes into account specific aspects of poverty, such as access
to education and infrastructure. This paper argues that poverty on the whole may not serve as an
appropriate variable in determining the formation of activist groups because poverty includes
different aspects that may have opposing effects on the presence of social conflict, e.g.
11

education, nutrition, income, contacts in society, etc. Rather, digging deeper to examine specific
issues such as access to electricity, roads, water, sanitation, and elementary schools might yield
more fruitful results.

Education:
When education is added to the poverty equation, steadier trends begin to emerge.
Krueger and Maleckova (2003) found that having either a higher education or a standard of
living above the poverty line was linked with participation in Hezbollah. Working with the
Hezbollah data from Krueger and Maleckova (2003), Kavanagh (2011) found a conditional
relationship between poverty, education, and involvement with Hezbollah. Her results
demonstrated that it was not poverty alone but poverty among the highly educated that was a
determinate factor in involvement in this terrorist organization. Moreover, she found that a high
level of education was a much stronger determinant of activist group involvement for the
economically disadvantaged than for those who had access to money.
As to the reasoning behind the increased incidence of highly-educated yet impoverished
terrorists, it appears not to be the choice of the individual as much as it is the screening process
of the terrorist organization that is the determining factor. Kavanaugh (2011) asserts that the
lowered opportunity costs for impoverished, highly-educated individuals make them more
susceptible and available for recruitment. Low opportunity cost means the individual has to forgo
or give up very little in the way of resources in order to take advantage of an opportunity. In
short, without lucrative careers or prospects for the future, they may perceive their situations as
having little to lose. As the economy suffers, educated people lose their jobs and are more likely
12

to apply to become terrorists because they have fewer options. Krueger (2007) asserts that it is
not that the terrorists have nothing to live for, rather, that they believe so strongly in a cause to be
willing to die for it. This is one of the many contradictions that arise when reviewing the
literature of terrorist and other social movements, especially at the case study level.
Moreover, poverty does not necessarily have to be a personal motivator. Ted Gurr (2006)
brings up the idea of relative deprivation to explain participation in social conflict. People may
be more prone to join social conflict events if they, a group they belong to, or other people they
know, are deprived of something that they believe they deserve. When people compare their
positions in society to others', they may realize they have less than those around them. This
effect can incite people to violence even if they are not personally affected because they may still
want redress for the relative deprivation (of their social group or others) around them.
James Davies (1970) offers another explanation for the abundance of poor, highly
educated activists in When Men Revolt and Why. Perhaps more educated individuals have higher
expectations than others and this increases their frustration with the regime. He argues that
people have constantly rising expectations that over time are satisfied less and less until a point
where gratifications actually downturn and the people can no longer tolerate the gap between
what they want and what they receive. Often this happens as economic conditions undergo a
period of steady improvement before falling off, but it can also occur more suddenly. For
example, the violent suppression of a movement, or the abuse of an employee or farmer, is a
downturn in the people's perception that their expectations will continue to be satisfied. "Tear gas
or a billy club are not rising gratifications, nor do they produce rising expectations. They dash
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the expectation that tear gas will not be used and that the public park will at last be integrated."
(Davies 1970, 134) At this time people will organize a revolution, or in this case a social conflict
event. Due to this shared frustration toward the regime, people with divergent interests may work
together in order to see their expectations met.
Either way, the Hamas organization has no shortage of applicants to its suicide bomber
ranks:
“The selection process is complicated by the fact that so many wish to
embark on this journey of honor. When one is selected, countless others are
disappointed. They must learn patience and wait until Allah calls them,” says a
senior member of al-Qassam. (Hassan 2001, n.p.)
This could be applied to social conflict events in that people in a floundering economy might
have fewer options and disincentives, increasing the chances of their participation in riots and
protests. Furthermore, according to Brass (2003) and Horowitz (2000) many rioters participate in
violence because they believe so strongly in the need to redress grievances.
Education is more than just an adjunct to poverty and is directly important in its own
right as a predictor of participation in political violence. Extremist groups prefer to select highly
skilled, educated members because they are more efficient operatives. Benmelech and Berrebi in
2007 found that suicide bombing missions carried out by Palestinian bombers from high-skill
occupations or those who were highly educated, were more successful and resulted in more
Israeli deaths. Consequently, both Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad recruited mainly on
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college campuses. (Berrebi 2004)
It seems intuitive that violent organizations would prefer to hire highly educated persons,
just as much as any other entity. In this paper, controlling for influences such as the openness of
the political opportunity structure, the regression analysis includes access to education and will
attempt to corroborate or dispute previous claims that higher education increases participation in
political violence.

Economic Motivation:
While it has been previously established that poverty does not outright produce social
conflict, Gary Becker argues there is a connection between wealth and violent activism based on
the observation that "nations or regions that are experiencing rapid growth appear to have lower
incidences of terrorism." (Becker 2005, n.p.) Becker conjectures that political activism, including
violent uprising, is less appealing to individuals when their economic opportunities are
improving. So, if poverty does not directly cause social conflict, it could still be true that
economic growth reduces terrorism. (Becker 2005)
Building on this argument, findings from Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana (2004) show
that economic downturns are correlated with increases in activist organization membership.
Furthermore, economic development, democracy and openness in countries that are a source of
terrorism, reduce incidences of terrorism there. However, Bloomberg and Hess (2005) found that
in generally higher income countries, as income per capita rises, the state is more prone to
experience terrorism, and this effect is lessened by political openness. Furthermore, for countries
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on the lower end of the economic scale, income per capita is negatively related to terrorism and
openness positively related. Pape's (2005) findings also show that democratic states can
experience more terrorism because they are uniquely vulnerable. Domestic terrorism declines in
both low and high income countries that experience economic development. (Bloomberg and
Hess 2005) Kreuger and Laitin (2007) found that the GDP growth rate of the origin states of
terrorist organizations is unrelated to the amount of terrorist activity produced; however, the
GDP growth rate of the target states is significantly related to terrorist attacks there.
Doug McAdam (1988) puts forward an explanation for the connection between economic
opportunity and social conflict in Freedom Summer. He argues that upper class people often are
more able to affect their environments than lower class people. Wealthy persons' access to
resources including money, education, and contacts in society gives them more control over their
surroundings. As a result, rich people are more likely than poor people to see the world as
malleable and themselves as masters of their own fates. Therefore, higher income, higher
educated people are more likely to participate in social conflict because they believe that protests
and strikes do have the capacity to redress grievances.
Also considering the haves and the have-nots, Honaker in 2008 estimated the separate
employment rates of Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland and found that unemployment
leads to perceptions of economic discrimination and was a significant causal mechanism for the
intensity of conflict there during the time of “The Troubles,” which began in the late 1960s and
ended in 1998. During this period, the Republicans, the largely Catholic minority who wanted
Northern Ireland to leave the United Kingdom and form a united Irish Republic, felt they were
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being discriminated against economically by the Loyalists, who came mostly from the Protestant
community and wanted Northern Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom. As would be
expected, unemployment of Catholics was a leading cause of the violence by Republican
(Catholic) factions. As an added result, Honaker also discovered that Loyalist (Protestant)
violence increased when unemployment rate of Protestants rose. (Honaker 2008)
Finally, Burgoon (2006) found that generous social welfare policies tend to reduce
poverty, inequality and religious-political extremism and thereby decrease the formation of
activist groups and social conflict. Burgoon found a negative correlation between a country’s
welfare efforts and the number of transnational or total terrorist incidents there, as well as
transnational terrorist attacks committed by its populace. He suggests that strengthening social
welfare policies at home and abroad may help combat activist violence. Such policies as social
security, unemployment, disability, health and education spending discourage violent uprising by
reducing poverty, inequality, and socioeconomic insecurity, hence reducing incentives to commit
or condone violence for political reasons, and by weakening radical political and religious groups
that provide economic security where public safety nets are deficient. A logical assumption, then,
would be to include the development and maintenance of social welfare policies as part of the
strategy to combat violent activism. Burgoon is quick to point out that while social welfare
policies will decrease preferences for terrorist activities, they may also increase the capacity to
organize and perpetuate terrorism. (Burgoon 2006)
This paper taps into these issues with the variables of National Material Capabilities
(NMC) and Access to Education and Infrastructure (AEI). As NMC measures a state's military
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and industrial strength, it might help this study to corroborate Becker's findings about the
negative relationship between economic strength and violent activism. AEI also measures state
strength by examining the government's ability to provide services and by association identify
and control its people. If AEI and NMC are significantly related to social conflict, they might
help to substantiate Burgoon's findings in 2006.

State Strength:
Existing research does not support the assertion that weak or failed states breed violent
activism. Edward Newman (2007) has demonstrated that terrorist groups form in both strong,
stable states and weak or failed states, making a relationship between governmental stability and
formation of terrorist organizations difficult to find. As social conflict is largely a local
phenomenon, it is more likely that the perpetrators of violence will challenge the government
that directly oversees their district, rather than start an uprising that has any connection to a
failed national government. In fact, often the activists exploit the logistical and economic
opportunities available in a stable state to accomplish their aims. While some violent groups do
form in weak or failed states, it is not necessarily so, and this condition is not a sufficient
explanation for their presence. (Newman 2007)
On the other hand, Boaz Atzili (2010) using data from the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO), Hezbollah in Lebanon, and two mini-cases from Central America and
Africa explored the various mechanisms through which the "vacuum of power” that is created in
the absence of a strong state, translates into opportunities for terrorist groups. Among these
mechanisms are the ease of obtaining assistance and recruitment among refugees or other
18

marginalized groups, the ability of the terrorist organization to appeal to the populace as a
“surrogate state” that supplies institutions and services, the relations between civil or communal
discord and the terrorist groups’ success, and the use of transnational terrorist organizations as
surrogates for other states. (Atzili 2010) Here is another of the great inconsistencies in social
movement and terrorism literature.
This paper operationalizes the idea of state strength using NMC and AEI. Hopefully by
examining the entire continent of Africa using these structural variables, the paper will be able to
shed some light on the paradox of Newman and Atzili's research. This study hypothesizes that
some aspects of state strength, such as the ability to provide public goods, will discourage social
conflict, while other aspects of state strength, such as military and industrial might, may
encourage the formation of activist groups.

Social Movements:
This paper follows the assumption that most political violence sprouts from social causes.
McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) developed three main concepts that are central to social
movement theory: political opportunities, mobilizing structures and cultural dimensions.
Protests, revolutions, civil wars, etc. are shaped by the political structures and opportunities that
are specific to the nations in which they arise. McAdam and his colleagues identify four aspects
of political opportunity structure:


the comparative closure or openness of political systems



the stability/instability of the elite
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the existence or lack of elite allies



the state's capacity to repress

After considering the political opportunity structures, McAdam et al (1996) consider mobilizing
structures which are the mediums through with individuals mobilize and become active in
collective action. Mobilizing structures include the organizational structures of social
movements, and the friends and family that support them. Finally, they consider the shared
culture of a population which brings them together, motivates them, and makes their causes
legitimate. (McAdam et al 1996)
Along similar lines, Jenkins and Klandermans (1995) examine how state structures, party
systems and other processes influence social movements. In its role as the primary distributor of
socially valued goods, the state is frequently the focus and antagonist of social movements.
Social movements must come into contact with the state in order to significantly alter the social
institutions and practices that shape the social and political world. According to their findings
(Jenkins and Klandermans 1995), variations in political opportunity structures explain the
differences between countries in their “protest potential.” Comparative analysis of states should
consider both the states as units of analysis and their different frameworks for political actions.
Della Porta and Rucht (1995) found that the trajectories of similarly situated social movements
are related and are determined principally by the proponents and opposition. Additionally, both
the formal institutions of the state and its informal incorporation or segregation of elites towards
social movements comprise its political opportunity structures. Furthermore, the interactions of
the establishment, their opponents and various alliances shift over time, and affect the
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negotiating power of social movement groups. Jenkins and Klandermans (1995) effectively
argue that a society's protest potential is established by political arrangements.
Campbell (2013) studied potential participants in social movements. In order to
determine which individuals will participate in a social movement, one must focus on individuals
and social networks. In fact, the two approaches complement each other. The characteristics of
individuals that are known to correlate with participation in social movements such as education,
religious attendance, political acuity, political principles and civic duty all have a social
component. (Campbell 2013)
Goldstone (2001) claims that the individualistic and network-wide factors that cause
nonviolent social movements to fail might cause violent movements to emerge. One such factor
is whether the state has the ability to provide the goods and services that are expected by elites
and various citizen groups such as workers, peasants, and religious, ethnic or regional minorities.
Another is whether the elites are mostly unified or divided and if the opposition elites join in
protests by well-supported citizen groups. Moreover, population growth that exceeds economic
growth can alter the relationship between the state, the elites and organized groups. Lastly,
Goldstone (2001) asserts that there are inherent faults in many dictatorships and colonial regimes
that lead to social conflicts, specifically revolutions.
Theda Skocpol (1994) argues broadly that revolutions cannot occur unless prior to
revolutionary activity, the respective devices of state repression have become weakened and the
individuals with an inclination to participate in such revolutions are able to form independent and
“well-supported collective organizations.” Presumably the important questions are: why do
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some regimes grow weak and why do some activist populations become well organized? In
accordance with state-centered structuralism, Skocpol claims that these two things happen almost
autonomously. (Skocpol 1994)
This paper addresses political opportunities and mobilizing structures with three
variables: NMC, FIW (Freedom in the World - Political Rights) and ELF (Ethno Linguistic
Fractionalization). FIW and ELF measure political opportunity structure by analyzing the level
of political rights and the uneven distribution of power along ethnic lines. NMC measures state
strength and the government's ability to stop protesters from mobilizing.

Government Repression:
There is evidence that the lack of political freedom and access also affect individual
participation decisions. When political channels for change become blocked, violent resistance
becomes more appealing. (Crenshaw 2010) As stated earlier, White (1989, 1993), when studying
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), found that state repression was a major
determinant of political violence. Furthermore, Lichbach (1987) found that changes in
government repression affect an opposition group’s choice between violent and nonviolent
tactics. Depending on what activities the government is repressing, other activities increase
(violent vs. nonviolent activities). If governments quickly shut down nonviolent civil resistance,
violent social conflict will increase in an attempt to be efficacious.
This paper draws on ideas of government repression by attempting to operationalize
political opportunity structure in two ways. First, the regression uses FIW's political rights figure
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to analyze a population's ability to engage in the political process, with the expected result that
more political rights leads to fewer social conflict events. Second, the model uses an updated
version of the ELF statistic in order to measure oppression along ethnic boundaries, with the
hypothesized outcome that more division of power along ethnic lines causes more social conflict.

Ethnic Group Conflict:
Africa suffers from excessively bureaucratic political systems as well as feeble
institutions, including the absence of legal legitimacy and the inability to operate without
government takeover, and the lack of substantial social capital in society to help avoid and
manage conflict. (Gebeyehu 2013) Many Africans align and mobilize themselves along ethnic
boundaries because power and resources are not distributed equally, rather than some innate
hatred. Over an extended period of time, undermining the strength of politically motivated ethnic
divisions involves a methodical public education platform focused on creating the sort of single
national identity that numerous African states still require. (Aapengnuo 2010) In line with
Gebeyehu and Aapengnuo, this thesis does not focus on ethnic hatred, but rather the extent to
which political opportunity structure is closed by an unfair distribution of power along ethnic
lines.
Overall, structural volatility and social conflict in African states is increasing. In order to
alleviate these issues, intervening third parties must manage the crises in the short term, but also
resolve the long term underpinnings of conflict. Frequently, these two objectives work contrary
to each other, and there is a substantial difference in the effectiveness of particular approaches.
According to Quinn et al (2013), conflict mediators are much more effective when dealing with
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short term crises, especially when they assume a more intrusive strategy. Conversely, these
mediators are completely insignificant when it comes to long term crisis management,
demonstrating no capacity to curtail recurring conflict. (Quinn et al 2013)
The high level of ethnic conflict in Africa, among other influences mentioned earlier, is
one of the main reasons for including ELF in the regression model for this study. Although
literature is focused on ethnic hatred, much social conflict is focused on the government.
Therefore this thesis posits that if ELF proves to be a significant predictor of social conflict, it
will be more because of ELF's effect on the political opportunity structure than on intergroup
animosity. The rich cache and variation of ethnic group data available in Africa should not only
help to produce significant results from a regression analysis, but also represents a principal
reason for studying social conflict in the first place. If power being divided along ethnic lines
causes the number of social conflict events to increase substantially, especially when overarching
variables such as NMC and FIW are included as controls, then the importance of ethnic conflict
as a whole becomes more apparent.

Modernization Theory:
Modernization theory views inequality from the functionalist perspective and attempts to
explain society's evolution from traditional to modern. It developed into a popular,
multidisciplinary methodology (relying on political science, psychology, economics, sociology
and history) of development studies in the 1950s. The central argument of modernization theory
is that modernization is unavoidable, unalterable, and assumes a linear progression. This
transition can happen through the dissemination of Western politics, economic systems,
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technological advances, and cultural progression through international aid programs, investment,
educational curricula and media organizations. The spread of funds, technology, and culture
from the developed world to the underdeveloped states is what enables modernization, according
to proponents of the theory. Modernization as a perspective was broadly critiqued by worldsystems advocates, dependency theorists, and neo-Marxists and was widely considered
discredited by the 1970s. (Da Silva 2009)
Many opposing researchers disagreed with modernization theory's fundamental
assumption that there was only one feasible road to improvement. "This constricted and rather
unimaginative vision of what was in effect the future of humanity" was a Western reaction to the
Cold War and the threat posed by the Soviet Union and Communism. (Adas 2003, in Da Silva
2009, n.p.) Critics regarded the modernization perspective as exceedingly ethnocentric, dubbing
it a "none too subtle form of cultural imperialism." (Adas 2003, in Da Silva 2009, n.p.)
Modernization also appeared to be more of a Westernizing process than an advancement process,
in which non-Western countries could only improve if they "abandoned their traditional cultures
and assimilated technologically and morally 'superior' Western ways." (Ingelhart & Baker 2000,
in Da Silva 2009, n.p.) Finally, critics contended that modernization theory was based on the
faulty claim that there existed a "causal relationship between development aid and economic
development, on the one hand, and between economic development and its political
consequences, on the other." (Kaufman 1982, in Da Silva 2009, n.p.; Haefele 2003)
Policies originating from modernization theory were founded on the assumption of a
"functional interdependence of economic growth and democratization." (Knobl 2003, in Da Silva
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2009, n.p.) Towards the end of the 1960s, many academics established that "tradition is not at all
the opposite of modernity" and the belief in a "stable, homogenous, inflexible, 'traditional'
culture is wrong." (Knobl 2003, in Da Silva 2009, n.p.) Perhaps obviously to contemporary
researchers, modernization can have various significances depending on the cultural connotation.
Moreover, maintaining that a "market society will automatically bring forward a democratic
parliamentary system" ignores historical examples. (Knobl 2003, in Da Silva 2009, n.p.)
The similarities between modernization theory and this paper are impossible to deny.
Modernization theory maintains that spreading Western politics, culture, economics and
technology to developing states is beneficial for these countries' development and improvement.
This study hypothesizes that increasing access to education and technology, features of Western
culture, within a developing state will decrease that country's amount of social conflict. This
paper also introduces themes from Western politics and society, such as the ability to freely and
effectively participate in the governmental process, and the division of political power among
interest groups, etc, to help explain social conflict. Finally, the variable NMC brings in aspects of
Western economics by attempting to account for social conflict using predictors including
military size, industrial strength, and population.
However, there are also principal differences between this thesis and modernization
theory. Most importantly, political opportunity structure is a main predictor for this paper's
explanation of social conflict events. Economic development alone does not decrease conflict.
Moreover, NMC and AEI together operationalize the concept of state strength, which is much
broader than economic progress and incorporates aspects outside of Modernization theory.
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The Case of Africa:
Why choose Africa as a focus for testing the structural causes of social conflict? First,
there is rich, recent data for social conflict on the African continent. Second, there is more social
conflict on the African continent than in many other areas of the globe. Third, much of Africa
scores on the low end for the predictor variables used in this paper. Variation at this lower end of
the scale should lead to larger differences in number of social conflict events because each
change should have more impact on people. For example, if most of the people have little-to-no
political rights, gaining some rights should have more of an effect than if people with myriad
political rights gain an added civil liberty, such as a stronger right to privacy.
Many African states lack the financial and cultural resources to provide public goods. Per
information from the United Nations Development Program (2013), twenty-seven (90%) of the
world’s thirty poorest countries are in Africa. In some areas, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) have taken the place of the government providing health care, water, and education.
(Ihonvbere 1994) (Mbaku 2000)
Current infrastructure statistics in Africa are bleak and do not show many signs of
improvement. African air transport is very expensive; many connections do not happen
according to plan, and the continent as a whole has a poor safety record. Only 34 percent of
Africans have access to roads year-round and public transportation is overcrowded and too
expensive (about $0.30 per trip) for most household budgets. Recurring complications with the
power grid hinder production in more than 30 African states. "Inadequate generation capacity,
limited electrification, low demand for power, unreliable service, and skyrocketing prices cause
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serious bottlenecks in the [power] sector." (African Development Bank Group 2011, n.p.) Over
60 percent of people in Africa do not have access to safe sanitation. Moreover, a third of the
African population use the outdoors as a toilet and about half depend on antiquated latrines.
Finally, just 58 percent of Africans have safe drinking water available to them. (African
Development Bank Group 2011) Combine these aspects of weak statehood with a closed
political opportunity structure, and Africa should be prone to political violence.
Africa's political opportunity structure is closed because it suffers from oppressive and
corrupt elites.
"In most African countries today, most governments pursue and advance
primarily the interests and objectives of a few individuals and groups--mostly those of the
ruling elites and their supporters... In many instances, civil servants engaged in illegal
activities to extract income for themselves; judicial officers adjudicated cases based
primarily on the wealth and political status of the defendant; judges often used their
positions to punish their enemies and those of their relatives and supporters; and senior
military elites routinely converted resources destined for their troops into their personal
property." (Mbaku 2000, 32-34)
Moreover, population increases in these nations far exceed economic expansion. (Ergas
1986; World Bank 1981; Mbaku 1997) On the whole, African states are often led by regimes
with significant vestiges of colonialism and dysfunctional, oppressive government systems.
(Mbaku 2000)
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THEORETICAL INTUITION

This paper relies on a number of basic assumptions about the nature of un-armed violence
and social conflict. First, I define social conflict to include protests, riots, strikes, inter-communal
clashes, and government action against the population provoked by the people. Second, as
opposed to organized groups, political parties, militias, warlords, etc, the instigators of social
conflict are ordinary people. Third, rather than being driven by emotions or led like sheep, these
regular individuals take part in unarmed violence of their own logical choosing as a means to
redress grievances in a system that has removed them from the process.
My analysis begins with the political characteristics of everyday people. First, they will
act out in response to serious grievances, i.e. people will react to perceived affronts to themselves
and their communities by attempting to rectify the injustice. Second, these regular individuals are
rational, strategic actors who weigh alternatives and decide on the best course of action. Third,
they take into consideration three main incentives for political participation: safety, efficacy, and
convenience. Safety from social conflict involves security against physical repression while
demonstrating. It also consists of freedom from being sanctioned after the protest, e.g. through
arrest, harassment, discrimination, or penalization in the workplace. Efficacy includes knowing
the strength of the dissident movement and the chances that grievances will be redressed, or even
that the target regime will collapse. Convenience has to do with the fact that people are more
likely to participate in anything if it is easy for them to get involved. Riots may start sluggishly
and then quickly peak because ordinary people will find it easier and easier to participate after a
core assembly of dissenters handles planning and logistics. Convenience matters because as
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social conflict events become more convenient, they are able to draw in participants who might
feel less attached to the relevant grievances.
The characteristics of social conflict events themselves reveal when people might choose
protests and riots instead of other types of political activism to address grievances. The first
aspect falls under the category of political opportunity structure. The premise of political
opportunity structure is that "exogenous factors enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for
particular sorts of claims to be advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of influence
to be exercised, and for movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy."
(Meyer and Minkoff 2004) Political blocking, i.e. the exclusion of groups from the political
process, can be separated into ethnic and regime type. Ethnic blocking involves the division of
power along ethnic lines. Riots and other social conflict events should often emerge as a method
of addressing this problem because of ethnic groups' motivation and ability. All the members of
one ethnic group share common perspectives and grievances to motivate them. They may also
have the ability to easily plan and convene a protest because of stronger intergroup social
networks. Alternatively, regime type blocking concerns autocracy and the prohibition / failure of
democracy. The population may turn to social conflict in the face of regime blocking because
they have no ability to influence the government through normal means like elections.
People believe participation in social conflict will be efficacious because their political
opportunity structure restricts regular politics. Riots may seem a practical recourse for citizens
who have no representation in government because they need no permission to participate and
may be able to force the state to address them. In other words, social conflict lends power to the
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people because governments do not want protests and will try to avoid them in the future. Riots
and protests can succeed in attempting to redress grievances no matter the political opportunity
structure, so social conflict is a viable alternative when other routes of political expression are
closed.
The second aspect of this social conflict analysis is state strength. First, protesters in
strong states are not free from retribution as they might be in weak states because the
government can identify and punish demonstrators. Therefore, weak states should experience
more social conflict because they do not have the resources to fight communal violence. Second,
warlord style weak state governments may allow riots to happen rather than expend resources to
control them. Furthermore, as a corollary to this argument, strong states usually provide more
public goods to the people, so citizens might endure fewer grievances. Weak states leave
openings for insurgent groups to offer services and gain the public's favor.
The final factor in this examination of social conflict is participation effort. A small
group of core dissenters often plan riots and protests, making it simple and easy for the general
public to get involved. For the vast majority of participants, all they have to do is show up.
Demonstrators can feasibly march in a protest, then return to their normal lives, which is next to
impossible with civil wars and revolutions. These kinds of social conflict events also possess just
enough lack of organization to preserve the demonstrators' agency to act creatively, instead of
forcing a hierarchical structure.
There are three main alternatives to social conflict. First, ordinary people can choose to
participate in armed revolutions and civil wars. Second, citizens may elect to take part in
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nonviolent civil resistance movements. Third, as always when action is concerned, the
population may decide to not participate in social movements and do nothing at all.
In the first case, people may choose social conflict over armed rebellion because
participation is simpler and easier and danger is distributed across a large group of unidentified
dissenters. Civil wars and revolutions offer much less individual protection for participants than
riots and protests. They also require more planning and organization, and it is more difficult to
partake because of the necessary military operations. As stated earlier, social conflict is less
demanding than armed rebellion, because participants are able to return to their everyday lives
after demonstrating, which is unlikely in a revolution. Moreover, problems they perceive in
society may merit violent uprising, but not a complete change of government. If people attempt
to redress their grievances through social conflict, but are unable to foment the desired change,
they may decide that their injustices warrant the escalation into all-out rebellion. Following this
line of reasoning, social conflict may in fact precede revolutions and serve as a precursor in their
development. Therefore, arguments for rebellion can also be viewed as supporting social
conflict.
For the second alternative, potential participants might choose social conflict over
nonviolent resistance because of safety and efficacy reasons. If the government cracks down
quickly and violently on nonviolent movements, protesters' safety and efficacy are compromised
because they have a substantial chance of being harmed and the movement does not have the
opportunity to gain critical mass. They might as well turn to violence themselves in order to have
a chance at redressing their grievances; i.e. riots may begin as nonviolent movements that did not
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reach the intended level of efficacy. Furthermore, civil resistance does not have the same
perception of efficacy of riots and protests and people might assume that governments will take
them less seriously. Moreover, the individualistic and network-wide factors that cause nonviolent
social movements to fail might cause violent movements to emerge, including the government's
ability to provide public goods and the extent that the elites are unified behind the government.
Finally, people might choose social conflict over nonviolent civil resistance because they feel
that particular grievances deserve a more forceful response than pacifist activism.
Lastly, people can decide to do nothing. Sometimes, doing anything at all is too difficult,
too dangerous, or simply not perceived to be effective. Obviously, if people do nothing, they do
not expect to see results. Therefore, this choice comes down to decision calculus. As mentioned
above, people will consider their personal safety and convenience, and the overall efficacy of a
movement when deciding. Each individual's choice is determined by the choices made by others.
At low levels of dissent, the personal value to not participate is much higher than the choice to
participate because governments can quickly find and punish small groups of dissenters. As the
number of demonstrators rises, the power of the regime to sanction any single individual falls. In
order for society to breach the hump from low levels of dissent to high enough participation for
riots to form, two things must happen. First, groups that have lower tipping points combine to
inflate the percentage of participation enough that groups with higher thresholds will be affected.
Second, as more groups reach tipping points, other groups will observe them and lower their
perceptions of the regime's will or effectiveness.
In summary, at least part of the variation in African social conflict should be explained by
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political opportunity structure and state strength because of their effect on people's safety,
efficacy, and convenience. For political opportunity structure, citizens' ability to influence their
government through normal methods like elections should affect the types of grievances they
feel and how willing they are to resort to group activism. For state strength, weaker governments
are less able to identify and punish demonstrators, so people should feel that protesting is safer in
weak states.
AEI and NMC operationalize the idea of state strength, which affects protesters' safety,
because strong governments should be able to identify and punish demonstrators. NMC
measures a state's military and industrial strength and AEI measures a state's ability to provide
public goods and by corollary to affect their lives and stop social conflict. If a government knows
who they are providing education to, they know details about their people, perhaps enough to
identify and punish protesters. State strength affects efficacy and convenience, because strong
governments should find it easier to shut down protests before they gain momentum. Therefore,
as access to education and infrastructure and national material capabilities increase, the number
of social conflict events should decrease.
As opposed to state strength, which influences when protesters will or will not engage in
social conflict, ELF and FIW represent political opportunity structure, which affects when
protesters will or will not engage in regular politics. FIW measures the political rights that people
have to influence their government. ELF measures the distribution of political power along
ethnic lines. The relative openness of the political arena affects efficacy, because regular politics
in closed-structure countries is not efficacious. Furthermore, states with open political
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opportunity structures should generate fewer grievances for people to protest because they feel
their voices are being represented. Therefore, as ethnic fractionalization decreases and political
rights increase, the number of social conflict events should decrease.
As a final point, more than just assessing state strength, AEI relates to the basic traits of
ordinary people mentioned in the second paragraph of the Theoretical Intuition because it
measures grievances. If states provide more public goods to the people, the citizens might endure
fewer grievances and have fewer reasons to consider social conflict as a recourse for addressing
them.
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HYPOTHESIS

H1: As access to education and infrastructure increases, number of social conflict events will
decrease.
H2: As national material capabilities increase, number of social conflict events will decrease.
H3: As level of ethnic fractionalization increases, number of social conflict events will increase.
H4: As political rights increase, number of social conflict events will decrease.
HNull: The number of social conflict events is not affected by access to education and
infrastructure, national material capabilities, level of ethnic fractionalization, or extent of
political rights.
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DESIGN OF TEST

These hypotheses are tested by an adjusted ordinary least squares (OLS) panel corrected
standard errors time series regression model, developed by Beck and Katz (1995). Time-series
cross-section (TSCS) data, like the kind used in this paper, are characterized by recurring
observations of preset units. These could be anything from states / nations to individual leaders.
A researcher would typically analyze between 10 and 100 units over a period of 15 to 50 years.
(Beck and Katz 1995) This thesis analyzes 35 African states over a period of 16 years —19902005— attempting to contribute to an explanation of social conflict with variables that
encompass assorted aspects of state strength and political opportunity structure.
In 1990, there were 43 countries on the African continent. (Johnson 2014) This paper
examines 35 of these countries because they were the only ones with data available over a
substantial time period. The determining predictors were Access to Education and Infrastructure
(AEI) and Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF). Although AEI and ELF data were
unavailable for eight African states, National Material Capabilities (NMC) and Freedom in the
World (FIW) information was at least partly accessible. The mean of NMC and FIW values for
the eight missing countries from 1990-2005 were easily within one standard deviation of the
mean of the other 35 states for the same variables over the same time span. Therefore, the 35
states in the model are reasonably representative of the African continent as a whole, at least in
terms of NMC and FIW.
In order to measure strength of the state and ability to provide public goods, I included
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AEI and NMC data in the analysis as predictor variables. AEI is a compilation of school
attendance rates, literacy, and access to electricity, radio, television, sanitation, and potable
water. The data was split into areas of countries, so I found the mean of the regions in every state
and used it to give the entire country a score for each particular indicator. I used an un-weighted
mean because there was not a great deal of variation between regions. Then, I added the scores
for each indicator (school attendance, electricity, water, etc) together to compute a single score
for each African state. The information was gathered by the Climate Change and African
Political Stability (CCAPS) program at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security
and Law housed in the University of Texas at Austin. (Smith et al 2013) This paper uses version
4.0 of NMC, which covers the time period from 1816-2007. NMC creates a number for every
state, called the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) score, based on six indicators:
military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban
population, and total population. The information was collected by the Correlates of War
research project at the Pennsylvania State University. (Singer et al 1972, Singer 1987)
In order to determine openness of political opportunity structure, I incorporated Ethno
Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) and Freedom in the World (FIW) data in the study as
additional independent variables. The traditional ELF score has received criticism for not aptly
encapsulating the amorphous and slippery concept that is ethnicity. (Driessen 2008) In an
attempt to develop a better measure of the division of power along ethnic lines, Cederman,
Girardin, and Wimmer (2006) developed a new expert survey of ethnic groups (ESEG).
According to this survey, a group is considered politically relevant if an interest group claims to
represent them or ethnicity is the source of political discrimination. Their new Ethnic Power
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Relation dataset uses this survey to create an updated ELF score based on ESEG data (i.e. only
ethnopolitically relevant groups.) The ELF value used in this paper comes from this Ethnic
Power Relations dataset. The ESEG project is managed jointly by researchers at the Swiss
Federal Institute of Technology and the University of California at Los Angeles. FIW is a
comprehensive measure that condenses survey information into three numbers for each state:
Freedom Rating, Political Rights Rating, and Civil Liberties Rating (all ranging from 1-7).
Because this study is interested in political opportunity structure, I chose the political rights
figure to join the other variables in the model. The FIW report is published by Freedom House,
an independent U.S. organization founded in 1941 to expand freedom across the globe. (Freedom
House 2013) Freedom House assigns high values of FIW to states with few political rights and
low values of FIW to states with many political rights. In order to clarify the meaning of my
findings, I coded FIW in the opposite direction so that political rights and social conflict events
should have the expected negative relationship in the regression results.
The dependent variable for this paper was African social conflict, operationalized by the
Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD). SCAD is a registry of social conflict events
organized by country and year. Social conflict, as opposed to armed conflict, includes protests,
riots, strikes, inter-communal clashes, and government violence against the population. As with
AEI, the figures were assembled by the CCAPS program at the Robert S. Strauss Center for
International Security and Law housed in the University of Texas at Austin. (Hendrix and
Salehyan 2012)
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Table 1: Access to Education and Infrastructure Range by Year

AEI Year

High

Low

1990-2005

Egypt - 448.2396

Somalia - 106.9122

Note: Egypt and Somalia maintain their positions as states with most and least access to education and
infrastructure for all 16 years.

Table 2: Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization Range by Year

ELF Year

High

Low

1990

Liberia - 0.986

Burkina Faso, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania - 0.01

1991

Liberia - 0.986

Burkina Faso, Lesotho,
Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania - 0.01

1992

Liberia - 0.986

Burkina Faso, Lesotho,
Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania - 0.01

1993

Liberia - 0.986

Burkina Faso, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania - 0.01

1994

Liberia - 0.986

Burkina Faso, Gambia, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania - 0.01

1995-2005

Liberia - 0.986

Burkina Faso, Gambia, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Somalia, Swaziland, Tanzania - 0.01

Note: From 1990 to 2005 Liberia had the highest level of ethno linguistic fractionalization, while the list of
states tied at the lowest level of ELF fluctuated slightly from 1990 to 1994 before settling at Burkina Faso,
Gambia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Somalia, Swaziland, and Tanzania for 1995 to 2005.
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Table 3: Freedom in the World Political Rights Range by Year

FIW Year

High

Low

1990

Gambia, Namibia - 6

Burundi, Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritania,
Somalia - 1

1991

Benin, Gambia, Namibia,
Zambia - 6

Burundi, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritania, Somalia - 1

1992

Gambia - 7

Liberia, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Somalia - 1

1993

Benin, Gambia, Madagascar,
Mali, Namibia - 6

Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo - 1

1994

Benin, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Namibia - 6

1995

Benin, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Namibia - 6

1996

Benin, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Namibia - 6

1997

Benin, Madagascar, Malawi,
Namibia - 6

1998

Benin, Madagascar, Malawi,
Namibia - 6

1999

Benin, Madagascar,
Namibia - 6

Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Gambia, Rwanda, Somalia - 1

2000

Benin, Ghana, Madagascar,
Mali, Namibia - 6

Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Gambia, Rwanda - 1

2001

Ghana, Madagascar, Mali,
Namibia - 6

Rwanda - 1

2002

Ghana, Lesotho, Mali,
Namibia, Senegal - 6

Rwanda - 1

2003

Benin, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali,
Namibia, Senegal - 6

Central African Republic, Swaziland - 1

Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gambia, Liberia,
Mauritania, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
Somalia - 1
Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Gambia, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra
Leone, Somalia - 1
Burundi, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Gambia, Kenya, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Somalia - 1
Burundi, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Gambia, Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia - 1
Burundi, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Gambia, Niger, Republic of the Congo,
Rwanda, Somalia - 1
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2004

Benin, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali,
Namibia, Senegal - 6

Swaziland, Zimbabwe - 1

2005

Ghana - 7

Swaziland, Zimbabwe - 1

Table 4: National Material Capabilities Range by Year

NMC Year

High

Low

1990

Egypt - 0.00785

Swaziland - 0.0000496

1991

Egypt - 0.0082864

Swaziland - 0.0000518

1992

Egypt - 0.0085444

Gambia - 0.0000421

1993

Egypt - 0.0084834

Gambia - 0.0000404

1994

Egypt - 0.008545

Gambia - 0.0000435

1995-2005

Egypt - 0.0085745-0.0096214

Gambia - 0.0000442-0.000049

Note: From 1990 to 2005 Egypt had the highest level of national material capabilities, while by 1992 Gambia
passed Swaziland as the state with the lowest level of NMC. Egypt and Gambia maintained their high and low
positions for the remainder of the time period.
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Table 5: Social Conflict Events Range by Year

SCE Year

High

Low
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, GuineaBissau, Lesotho, Mauritania, Namibia, Republic of the
Congo, Rwanda, Uganda - 0

1990

Cote d'Ivoire - 9

1991

Democratic Republic of the
Congo - 26

Burundi, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Malawi,
Mozambique, Namibia, Somalia, Swaziland - 0

1992

Kenya - 29

Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Senegal, Swaziland - 0

1993

Nigeria - 31

Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho,
Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Swaziland - 0

1994

Nigeria - 30

Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar - 0

1995

Egypt - 24

Central African Republic, Gambia, Guinea, Madagascar,
Mali, Mauritania, Togo - 0

1996

Nigeria - 26

Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Togo - 0

1997

Kenya - 38

Gambia, Guinea, Madagascar, Mauritania, Namibia - 0

1998

Nigeria - 42

Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda - 0

1999

Nigeria - 51

Gambia, Togo - 0

2000

Nigeria - 78

Rwanda - 0

2001

Nigeria - 86

Mauritania, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda,
Swaziland - 0

2002

Nigeria - 81

Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Mali, Mozambique,
Namibia - 1

2003

Nigeria - 71

Ethiopia, Madagascar - 0

2004

Nigeria - 84

Lesotho, Namibia - 0
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2005

Nigeria - 77

Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Namibia, Rwanda - 0
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EMPIRICS

Due to the nature of variables over time, e.g. many factors do not change a great deal in
the space of several years, I expected the model to demonstrate strong autocorrelation and
groupwise heteroskedasticity. In order to confirm these problems, I ran the Wooldridge and
Modified Wald tests, which check for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity respectively. Once
verified, I decided to analyze the data using the Beck and Katz panel corrected standard errors
time series regression model. This method was developed to specifically account for
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, because often these issues are unavoidable in time series
data. In fact, when running the panel corrected standard errors regression, STATA now defaults
to the Beck and Katz model and assumes that the data is contemporaneously correlated and
heteroskedastic.

Wooldridge Test:
I first conducted a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in the panel data. Jeffrey
Wooldridge at the University of California, San Diego developed this test as a simple way to use
the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) residuals from a model that had been first-differenced to
determine autocorrelation. (Wooldridge 2010) Due to this foundation on first differences, the
Wooldridge test can suffer from a loss of power compared to some of the alternatives.
However, other similar methods including the Durbin-Watson statistic generalized by
Bhargava et al. (1982), the Lagrange Multiplier derived by Baltagi and Li (1991, 1995) and
Baltagi and Wu (1999), and the portmonteau Lagrange Multiplier statistic suggested by Inoue
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and Solon (2006), all have more relevant shortcomings. The Durbin-Watson statistic relies on the
amount of cross section units and the number of time intervals. Therefore, I would have been
forced to give all critical figures in large tables affected by both dimensions. The Lagrange
Multiplier does not have the customary χ2 distribution because of the bias in estimating the
autocorrelation coefficient. Finally, the Inoue and Solon (2006) Lagrange Multiplier statistic is
designed for panels with smaller time periods. With a moderate T as in my model, the Lagrange
Multiplier test loses accuracy because the null hypothesis' dimension rises as T2 increases.
Moreover, the Wooldridge test depends on fewer assumptions, so although it might be less
powerful that the other measures, it is more robust.
In reviewing the linear model,

"Where

is the dependent variable;

is a

vector of time-varying covariates;

vector of time-invariant covariates; ,
the individual-level effect; and

, and

are

parameters;

is a
is

is the idiosyncratic error." (Drukker 2003, 169)

The Wooldridge test employs the residuals from a first-differenced regression, shown
below. This eliminates the constant, the time-invariant term, and the individual-level effect.

Where

is the operator for the first differences. Wooldridge estimates
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by regressing

on

and taking the residuals
, then

. Wooldridge observes that if there is no correlation among the
. Therefore, the residuals

are regressed with first-

differenced variables on their lags and the Wooldridge procedure tests if the lagged residuals
coefficient equals

. Accounting for correlation within the panels of the

to

regression,

the Wooldridge test adjusts the variance-covariance matrix (VCE) for panel level clustering. Due
to the nature of the cluster command in STATA, the Wooldridge test is robust in regard to
conditional heteroskedasticity. (Drukker 2003)
The results of the Wooldridge test demonstrated strong autocorrelation in my model.
H0: no first-order autocorrelation
F(1, 34) = 15.109
Prob > F = 0.0004

Modified Wald Test:
Second, I performed a Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity in the fixed
effect regression model. The Standard Wald test, likelihood ratio, and Lagrange Multiplier
statistic are all sensitive to assuming the normality of errors. The Modified Wald test is
appropriate for this paper because it is designed for cases when the assumption of normality may
be violated asymptotically. The Modified Wald test is weak when dealing with models that have
large N, small T panels. The time series regression for this project does not fall into that category.
The null hypothesis states

for

, where
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is the amount of cross-sectional

components. The Modified Wald test uses

as the estimator of the cross-

sectional variance in errors for the ith component, according to the

residuals

accessible for

that component. (Baum 2001) Then the procedure defines

as the predicted variance for

is distributed as

. The Modified Wald test statistic, below,

below the null hypothesis. (Baum 2001)

This trial revealed that the analysis also suffered from heteroskedasticity.
H0: sigma(i)2 = sigma2 for all i
chi2 (35) = 36445.38
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Both of these test results were to be expected from a time series regression because of the
nature of variables over time, e.g. many factors do not change a great deal in the space of several
years. Therefore, I analyzed the data using the Beck and Katz panel corrected standard errors
time series regression model. Beck and Katz developed this method in order to account for
common time series regression errors, namely autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. In fact,
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when running the panel corrected standard errors regression, STATA now assumes that the data
is contemporaneously correlated and heteroskedastic.

Beck and Katz Model:
In 1995, Nathan Beck from the University of California, San Diego and Jonathan Katz
from the California Institute of Technology published an article in which they invalidated
numerous previous studies that used a generalized least squares (GLS) model to analyze TSCS
data. GLS assumes that researchers have information about the error process that they do not
have in practice. Therefore, analysts use a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) approach,
which employs an estimate of this error process information. However, in order to figure out the
standard errors, the FGLS procedure supposes that the these estimates are in fact known values.
Often, this does not pose an issue because applications have few enough parameters in their error
processes that they can be successfully estimated. Beck and Katz show that this is not the case
with TSCS data, because the error process has so many parameters. They provide evidence that
studies using FGLS underestimated variability by 50 to 300 percent.
As a solution to these problems, Beck and Katz instead promote an adjusted ordinary
least squares (OLS) method that retains OLS estimates of parameters, but replaces OLS standard
errors with panel-corrected standard errors. Although the characteristics of TSCS data make it
difficult to use OLS estimates for model parameters, OLS parameter estimates often perform
well in "practical research situations." (Beck and Katz 1995, 634) On the other hand, OLS
standard error estimates for TSCS are exceedingly inaccurate. Therefore, Beck and Katz
advocate keeping OLS estimates of parameters and replacing OLS estimates of standard errors
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with panel-corrected standard errors. They demonstrate that these new variability samples are
highly accurate, even when dealing with complex panel error arrangements.
The formula used to sample variability of OLS estimates comes from the square roots of
the diagonal terms of

If the errors are homoskedastic and adhere to the spherical assumption, this equation will
simplify to the original OLS formula, i.e. "where the OLS standard errors are the square roots of
the diagonal terms of
variance,

, where

is the usual OLS estimator of the common error

." (Beck and Katz 1995, 638) If the errors instead are heteroskedastic and follow the

panel structure, then this original OLS formula will provide inaccurate standard errors. However,
-

if the errors are of the latter type, then

-

can be used to provide

precise panel-corrected standard errors. (Beck and Katz 1995)
For panels like the ones in this paper, with errors that are auto correlated and
heteroskedastic, " is an

block diagonal matrix with an

matrix of

contemporaneous covariances, Σ, along the diagonal." (Beck and Katz 1995, 638) To find a
consistent estimate of Σ, Beck and Katz use the OLS residuals from the generic TSCS model:

"where

is a vector of one or more exogenous variables and observations are indexed by both

unit (i) and time (t)... Let

be the OLS residual for unit i at time t." (Beck and Katz 1995, 63650

638) To estimate a standard value for Σ:

so that the estimate
estimator

is comprised of all these components. This equation helps to create the

by forming a diagonal block matrix and placing the

As the amount of time periods increases,

matrices down the diagonal.

does better and better at estimating Σ. (Beck and Katz

1995)
In all of the Beck and Katz experiments, PCSEs performed superbly. When the errors
displayed homoskedasticity and independence, a situation where OLS standard errors are highly
accurate, PCSEs performed just as successfully as the OLS errors. More importantly, when faced
with extreme heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in the error terms, PCSEs
performed well consistently while the performance of OLS standard errors declined. In fact,
every time the PCSEs were inside 10 percent of actual variability. (Beck and Katz 1995)
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FINDINGS

Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors
(PCSEs):
Group variable: State1
Time variable: Year
Panels: correlated (balanced)
Autocorrelation: no autocorrelation
Estimated covariances = 630
Estimated autocorrelations = 0
Estimated coefficients = 5
Number of obs = 560
Number of groups = 35
Obs per group: min = 16
avg = 16
max = 16
R-squared = 0.2479
Wald chi2(4) = 52.53
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
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Table 6: Social Conflict Events in Africa Regression
Coef

Std Err

z

P>|z|

AEI

-.0254458

.005127

-4.96

0.000

ELF

1.94466

.6884785

2.82

0.005

FIW

-.4318902

.2342928

-1.84

0.065

NMC

3229.359

480.0612

6.73

0.000

Constant

7.453818

1.997748

3.73

0.000

Overall, the empirical analysis is supportive of the argument. The tests found that the
theoretical independent variables, political opportunity structure and strength of the state, both
have an effect on social conflict. Wald chi-squared and R-squared values suggest that the model
is complete and has substantial explanatory power.
The Wald statistic deals with a null hypothesis that states that a set of parameters in the
model is equal to a certain value. If the Wald test is unable to reject this null hypothesis, then if
variables were removed from the regression, the model would not be substantially harmed. This
is because an independent variable with a coefficient that is miniscule compared to its standard
error is usually not contributing much in predicting the result of the dependent variable. The
Wald test in this regression was able to reject the null hypothesis, indicating that each
independent variable contributes substantially to explaining the dependent variable and that even
in other time periods or with other units, the model would hold true. (Fox 1997) The R-squared
statistic determines how well the model explains the variation in the data being analyzed. For
example, an R-squared of 100 would mean that the independent variables explain all of the
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variation in the dependent variable. For a study that encompasses an entire continent, an Rsquared of 25 percent is a strong figure. (King 1986)
H1: As access to education and infrastructure increases, the number of social conflict events will
decrease. Supporting this hypothesis, in the results as access to education and infrastructure
increases, number of social conflict events decreases. For every one unit increase in the AEI
score, the number of social conflict events for the state per year drops by 0.03, a statistically
significant change at the 99 percent confidence level, with a P value of 0.000. An example from
the data: the state with the closest AEI value to the mean for the model is Benin in 2005 at
264.19 with three social conflict events. Namibia in 2005 had an AEI score of 335.1223 (close to
the 75th percentile of the total data on AEI) and experienced zero social conflict events.
H2: As national material capabilities increase, the number of social conflict events will decrease.
Opposite to this hypothesis, in the findings as national material capabilities increase, number of
social conflict events also increases. The reasoning for the original hypothesis was that weaker
governments would be less able to control their territory and identify and punish protesters.
However, the results are no less significant because of their direction. As NMC increases by
0.001, the number of social conflict events for the state per year rises by 3.2, a statistically
significant effect at the 99 percent confidence level, with a P value of 0.000. (The one thousandth
interval is used for NMC because the score compiled by the Correlates of War project uses small
decimals when assigning NMC values to states.) An example from the data: the state with the
closest NMC value to the mean for the model is Mozambique in 1993 at 0.0011661 with two
social conflict events. The Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1990 had an NMC score of
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0.0025798 (near the 25th percentile of the total data on NMC) and experienced four social
conflict events.
H3: As level of ethnic fractionalization increases, the number of social conflict events will
increase. In confirmation of this hypothesis, in the results as level of ethnic fractionalization
increases, number of social conflict events increases, i.e. states where power is divided along
ethnic lines endure more social conflict. For every unit increase in the ELF score, the number of
social conflict events for the state per year grows by 1.94, a significant difference at the 99
percent confidence level, with a P value of 0.005. An example from the data: the state with the
closest ELF value to the mean for the model is Zimbabwe in 1990 at 0.569 with four social
conflict events. Zambia in 1990 had an ELF score of 0.735 (close to the 75th percentile of the
total data on ELF) and experienced seven social conflict events.
H4: As political rights increase, the number of social conflict events will decrease. Although the
direction of the findings did uphold this hypothesis, it was only at the 93 percent confidence
level, with a P value of 0.065. Although FIW was expected to demonstrate a significant
relationship at a lower P value, the variable still has some explanatory power. As FIW climbs by
one unit, the number of social conflict events for the state per year decreases by 0.43. As political
rights increase, number of social conflict events decreases, i.e. as the population feels better able
to express their opinions and influence the democratic process, the fewer social conflict events a
state will experience. An example from the data: the state with an FIW value close to the mean
for the model is Central African Republic in 2002 at 5 with nine social conflict events. In 1994,
when the Central African Republic was more free and had an FIW rating of 3 (near the 25th
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percentile of the total data on FIW) it experienced only two social conflict events.
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DISCUSSION

AEI, NMC, ELF, and FIW operationalize the ideas of state strength and political
opportunity structure, which affect the safety, efficacy, and convenience of social conflict. Safety
from social conflict involves security against physical repression while demonstrating. It also
consists of freedom from being sanctioned after the protest, e.g. through arrest, harassment,
discrimination, or penalization in the workplace. Efficacy includes knowing the strength of the
dissident movement and its ability to shield demonstrators from repercussions, but also the
chances that grievances will be redressed, or even that the target regime will collapse.
Convenience has to do with the fact that people are more likely to participate in anything if it is
easy for them to get involved. For example, riots may start sluggishly and then quickly peak
because ordinary people will find it easier and easier to participate after a core assembly of
dissenters handles planning and logistics. Convenience matters because as social conflict events
become more convenient, they are able to draw in participants who might feel less attached to
the relevant grievances.
Supporting the theoretical explanation, the findings show that as access to education and
infrastructure increases, number of social conflict events decreases. AEI and NMC represent
state strength, which affects protesters' safety, because strong governments should be able to
identify and punish demonstrators; and efficacy and convenience, because strong governments
with developed law enforcement should find it easier to shut down protests before they gain
momentum. Moreover, strong states usually provide more public goods to the people, so citizens
might endure fewer grievances. This shows that funding education and infrastructure matters in
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countering conflict. For the academic, this research opens the door to a host of other questions
examining specific areas of infrastructure and education and determining if this finding only
holds true where access to education and infrastructure is generally low, as is the case in this
study. For the policy maker, this lends credibility to investment programs that target roadways,
electricity, sanitation, schools, etc. The significant AEI results can also help to settle decisions on
how the United States and other wealthy states should aid developing countries. Monetary
assistance could come with conditions stipulating spending focused on education and
infrastructure.
Opposite to what was theorized, as national material capabilities increase, number of
social conflict events also increases. There are several possible explanations for this unexpected
effect. First, states with higher NMC values may have strong militaries but not strong law
enforcement systems. The military often does not have local knowledge to appropriately address
communal issues better handled by police. In order to address this issue, future analyses might
include law enforcement per capita, instead of military personnel. Second, The military and
industrial strength measured by NMC might generate more grievances to protest because of
unpopular military activity or violations of worker's rights. Third, in states with low NMC
values, the government's actions may be less visible and seem less at fault for current conditions.
The citizens may have survival issues that are more salient than any government action. Take the
case of a starving town without access to water. Members of this community are more concerned
with feeding themselves and their families than protesting the structural government decisions
that caused their starvation in the first place. Or rather, returning to James Scott and Weapons of
the Weak, the population of these countries might lack formal organization and prefer to resist
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the government in smaller ways including foot dragging, noncompliance, deception, etc. (Scott
1985) Finally, some states may have large militaries, but even larger populations, so future
analyses might include military per capita instead of total military size in order to more
appropriately measure the military's ability to control the population.
Since states with higher national material capabilities are actually more likely to
experience social conflict than weaker states, researchers will have many questions. What part of
the NMC variable caused it to be so strongly correlated with social conflict events? Is NMC a
valid measure of state strength? And, if so, why would stronger states be more likely to
experience social conflict? Is this the case only in the lower portion of NMC scores (seeing as
African states have generally lower NMC values)? On the policy making side, does this explain
the presence of protests and related types of social conflict in developed states with high NMC
scores? Perhaps not, because first world states might not experience more social conflict overall
than less developed states. The direct relationship between NMC and SCAD may only exist
when moving among lower values of NMC.
Confirming the ELF hypothesis, as level of ethnic fractionalization increases, number of
social conflict events increases. The regression supports the theoretical explanation. ELF and
FIW represent political opportunity structure, which affects when protesters will not engage in
regular politics. The relative openness of the political arena affects safety, because it is
dangerous for citizens to attempt regular politics in closed systems, efficacy, because regular
politics in closed-structure countries is not efficacious; and convenience, because closed
governments make it impossible to get involved in the normal political process. Furthermore,
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states with open political opportunity structures should generate fewer grievances for people to
protest because they feel their voices are being represented. This demonstrates that politically
relevant ethnic groups' access to political power matters when it comes to social conflict. A
group is considered politically relevant if an interest group claims to represent them or ethnicity
is the source of political discrimination. Therefore, if interest groups are seen as having a
considerable influence in government, it can affect the level of social conflict. If groups are
discriminated against because of their ethnicity, it will also affect the level of social conflict. In
academia, this has ramifications for a wealth of ethnic conflict research. To what extent does
power have to be divided along ethnic lines for it to cause conflict? Does all ethnic
fractionalization cause conflict or is it more common between certain groups? In legislation, this
cements the importance of equal representation and opportunity. As governments begin to mirror
their populations, they should have more peaceful societies.
Further supporting the theoretical intuition, although at a lower level of significance, as
political rights increase, number of social conflict events decreases. FIW affects efficacy,
because regular politics in closed-structure countries is not efficacious. Moreover, states with
open democratic systems should generate fewer grievances for people to protest because they
feel that they can affect change through regular politics like elections. In academia, this opens up
avenues of research that statistically measure different areas of freedom and equality in order to
operationalize different variations on a common theme. The results also lend weight to previous
case-studies that emphasize the importance of political rights when assessing a successful
government. In the policy-making arena, this model supports U. S. State Department and USAID
programs that foster free and fair elections; improve participation of women, young people, and
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minorities; and encourage citizen engagement in the political process. It also reinforces the
mission of OSC independent and objective observers in assessing election legitimacy. Working
to spread suffrage rights, access to the media, accurate vote counting, etc, does have an effect on
the social conflict within states.
What are the effects of running this analysis in the African continent as opposed to other
regions of the world? As stated in the Theoretical Intuition, there is more social conflict on the
African continent than in many other areas of the globe. Furthermore, much of Africa scores on
the low end for the predictor variables used in this paper. Variation at this lower end of the scale
should lead to larger differences in number of social conflict events because each change should
have more impact on people. For example, moving from 25 percent access to water among the
population, to 35 percent access to water should have a more substantial effect than moving from
85 percent to 95 percent.
Nonetheless, due to the large scale nature of this project, the findings should hold true
during other time periods and in other areas of the world. The 35 African states analyzed in this
thesis vary substantially in all the variables used in the time series regression model, albeit at the
low end. Moreover, the Wald chi-squared and R-squared values suggest that the model is
complete and has substantial explanatory power.
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CONCLUSION

This thesis attempts to explain whether and to what extent a relationship exists between
political opportunity structure, strength of the state, and social conflict. What makes a state more
open or closed, or more strong or weak? The independent variables attempt to operationalize
these concepts from four different angles. In this analysis Access to Education and Infrastructure
(AEI), Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF), Freedom in the World Political Rights (FIW),
and National Material Capabilities (NMC) were all significant predictors of social conflict. This
study found that as the level of ethnic fractionalization and material capabilities within states
rose, the frequency of social conflict events also increased. Moreover, as access to infrastructure
and political rights declined, the number of social conflict events increased.
Social conflict events include protests, riots, strikes, inter-communal clashes, and
government action against the population provoked by the people Strikes and communal clashes
emerge as a method of confronting a closed political opportunity structure because citizens have
no ability to influence the government through normal means like elections, they need no
permission to participate in social conflict events, and they may be able to force the state to
address them. People also participate in riots and protests if they live in a weak state, because
weaker governments do not provide many public goods, nor are they able to identify and punish
protesters.
When facing a choice whether to participate in social conflict, armed revolution,
nonviolent civil resistance, or to do nothing, people will favor social conflict in a number of
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circumstances for several reasons. Social conflict is preferable to revolution because it requires
less effort and planning, and offers more individual protection for participants. Riots and protests
are preferable to nonviolent resistance when the government does not tolerate social movements,
because nonviolent resistance would not be more safe or efficacious than social conflict and
violence might increase the perception of the movement's strength. Finally, strikes and
communal clashes are preferable to inaction if people judge grievances to justify giving up some
safety, participation is convenient, and they perceive the movement to have a certain level of
efficacy.
For academics, using social conflict statistics to shed light on studies of violence might
prove fruitful. For policy makers and counter-terrorism practitioners, focusing on education and
infrastructure programs, economic development, equal representation, suffrage rights, and
election regulations should become a priority in conflict resolution.
In summary, at least 25 percent of the variation in African social conflict is explained by
political opportunity structure and state strength because of their effect on people's safety,
efficacy, and convenience. For political opportunity structure, citizens' ability to influence their
government through normal methods like elections affects the types of grievances they feel and
how willing they are to resort to group activism. For state strength, weaker governments are less
able to identify and punish demonstrators, so people feel that protesting is safer in weak states.
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FUTURE RESEARCH

In order to further investigate the structural causes of social conflict and the types of
predictors that exist, future research on this project will involve interacting AEI, NMC, ELF and
FIW to determine whether variable combinations will have additional effects. Another avenue of
examination is to split SCAD into organized vs. spontaneous events for some regression analyses
and government initiated vs. civilian initiated events for others. Also, there is a wealth of
information contained in my single variable, AEI. Moving forward, research will divide AEI into
its separate elements and run regression analyses based on those components alone and in
combination with other factors from the current model.
Since this paper takes an encompassing, structural approach to the study of social
conflict, it does not attempt to explore conflict's underlying processes and leaves room for case
studies to test the hypothesized micro-causal claims. Surveys and other means of data gathering
among the affected populations would be able to corroborate or weaken my arguments by asking
the people what their reasons were for participating or not participating in social conflict events.
In-depth examinations of certain states would give valuable background as to whether those
countries did indeed experience social conflict because of governments with the ability to repress
and closed political opportunity structures. Researchers can also obtain personal accounts to
determine whether a lack of access to education and/or infrastructure caused people to seek
redress of their situations.
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